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A VOICE FROM PEOPLE v. SIMPSON:
RECONSIDERING THE PROPENSITY RULE IN
SPOUSAL HOMICIDE CASES
"On doit des 6gards aux vivants; on ne doit aux morts que la v~ritg.
We owe respect to the living; to the dead we owe only truth."
-Voltaire'
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 1994, Ronald Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson
were brutally murdered.2 By June 14, the leading suspect in the case
was Orenthal James Simpson (O.J.), 3 the former husband of Nicole
Brown Simpson, who had been physically and verbally abusing Nicole
since the two met in 1977.' As the evidence linking O.J. to the crime
mounted, the public wondered how the popular football player could
have committed such a heinous crime.5 Others more familiar with
O.J. and Nicole knew better, having seen or heard about O.J.'s
physical and verbal abuse of Nicole.6 Warning signs of abuse and
control behavior in O.J. and Nicole's relationship went unnoticed or
ignored,7 and the violence may have spiraled to a deadly conclusion.
Millions of women like Nicole8 are beaten and dehumanized
every year by their spouses.' Violence is now the "leading cause of
1. FRANCOIS-MARIE AROUET VOLTAIRE 4 1 OEUVRES 15 (1785), reprinted in THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 717 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
2. Jim Newton & Shawn Hubler, Simpson Held After Wild Chase; He's Charged with
Murder of Ex-wife. Friend, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1994, at Al.
3. Jim Newton & Eric Malnic, Police Sources Link Evidence to Simpson, L.A. TIMES,
June 15, 1994, at Al.
4. People's Response to Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence of Domestic
Violence at *5, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1994 WL 737964 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A.
County Dec. 14, 1994) [hereinafter People's Response].
5. See Paul Feldman, D.A. Mounts Media Drive to Shape Opinion, L.A. TIMES, June
21, 1994, at Al.
6. See discussion infra part IV.
7. See infra part IV.
8. I do not wish to minimize the tragedy of Ronald Goldman's death by focusing on
O.J. and Nicole's relationship, but this Comment will only do so to illustrate the need to
reform the evidence code in spousal homicide cases.
9. The use of the word "spouse" in this Comment should be read to include non-
married partners who are in abusive relationships. Note, Developments in the Law: Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1501 (1993) [hereinafter
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injuries to women ages 15 through 44 years."'0 It is now estimated
that a man beats a woman every twelve seconds in the United
States." Between thirty and fifty percent of women murdered in the
United States die at the hands of their husbands or boyfriends.
12
Despite these overwhelming statistics, domestic violence continues to
be one of the most "pressing social and legal problem[s] in the United
States."' 3 Yet the legal response to domestic violence thus far can
only be described as grossly inadequate.
4
The treatment of women under the law in the United States has
traditionally been inequitable. 5 At common law, following her
marriage, a woman became the legal property of her husband. 6
"The historic sanction of woman abuse within marriage derives from
the husband's ownership of his wife and his right to chastise her."'7
Developments] (noting that there may be "as many as four million incidents of domestic
violence against women every year"); see also Susan E. Bernstein, Note, Living Under
Siege: Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence Victims?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 525,
525 (1993) (citing FBI statistics showing that "[n]early thirty percent of all women
murdered in America are killed by their husbands or boyfriends"); Elena Salzman, Note,
The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal
Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 329,329 (1994) (observing
that "[d]omestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the United States").
10. See Antonia C. Novello, From the Surgeon General, US Public Health Service: A
Medical Response to Domestic Violence, 267 JAMA 3132,3132 (1992) (finding "falls were
reported to be the leading cause of death overall," but "[s]uch high rates of falls among
young women should make health care providers suspicious" that these falls "are actually
sustained in beatings").
11. ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATrERING AND How TO STOP IT
6 (1994) ("A few years ago the FBI reported that in the United States a man beat [sic] a
woman every eighteen seconds. By 1989 the figure was fifteen seconds. Now it's twelve.").
12. Bernstein, supra note 9, at 525 (citing a 30% figure); Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do
Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38, 41 (estimating that it is 33% to 50%).
13. Developments, supra note 9, at 1501.
14. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 525 (concluding that "[t]raditional civil and criminal
remedies have failed to protect domestic violence victims against the pattern of threats and
harassment that constitute stalking and.., foreshadow more violent acts including assault,
rape, and murder"): see also A. Rende Callahan, Will the "Real" Battered Woman Please
Stand Up? In Search of a Realistic Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 117, 118 (1994) (concluding that "at worst, the community's disregard
of battered women borders on criminal"); Developments, supra note 9, at 1502 ("History
is replete with reports of domestic abuse, and ... an adequate legal response has long
been lacking.").
15. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the
Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 627-30 (1980) (discussing the legal
origins of woman abuse).
16. See id.; see also Gail D. Rodwan & Jeanice A. Dagher-Margosian, The Battered
Woman as Criminal Defendant, 73 MICH. BJ. 912, 920 (1994).
17. Schneider, supra note 15, at 628.
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Until the late 19th century, a husband could lawfully punish his wife,
as he would his child.' During this time, many states provided
explicit legal protection for batterers. 9 Amazingly, not until 1871
did the first states in the United States, Alabama and Massachusetts,
rescind their laws sanctioning wife abuse.2" Over 100 years later,
battered women still had "few legal remedies available to them."'"
This predicament finally began to change in the early 1970s, as
the battered women's movement brought public attention to the plight
of abused women.' As societal exposure to domestic violence
increased,' so did efforts to protect battered women, leading to new
laws aimed at reducing domestic violence.24 However, the continu-
ing belief, shared by those charged with carrying out these new
laws,2- that the state26 should not become involved in the private
18. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 164 (1987).
19. See Developments, supra note 9, at 1502; see also Bernadette D. Sewell, Note,
History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife
Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 991 (1989) (discussing an 1836 New Hampshire case
in which "[tihe court concluded that although society condemned the husband's unmanly
conduct in beating his wife, it abhorred even more the wife's unseemly rebellion against
the proper exercise of his authority").
20. Sewell, supra note 19, at 992-93 n.74 (discussing Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143,146-
47 (1871) and Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871)). See Maryanne E.
Kampmann, Note, The Legal Victimization of Battered Women, 15 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
101,.102 (1993) ("If the [husband] went too far, and ... killed his wife, the law frowned
on it, but this was a minor offense when compared with that of a woman killing her
husband, a treasonous act for which the woman would be burnt alive.").
21. Developments, supra note 9, at 1502.
22. Callahan, supra note 14, at 119-20.
23. Id. at 117-18. The massive publicity surrounding the murder of Nicole Brown and
the subsequent trial of OJ. Simpson have also brought the issue of domestic violence to
the attention of the public once again. See David E. Hicks & Steven M. Goldstein,
Defending the Domestic Violence Client, 68 FLA. BJ. 42, 42 (1994) ("Regardless of the
outcome of California v. Simpson [sic], one thing is certain, the issue of domestic violence
has now been thrust to center stage.").
24. Angela Corsilles. Note. No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Sohtion?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853,853 (1994)
(noting increase in laws designed to help prosecute domestic abusers).
25. Developments, supra note 9, at 1503 ("Police officers have been trained, and have
acted upon the belief, that domestic violence is a private matter.").
26. Callahan, supra note 14, at 118 n.3 ("Recent studies of the judicial response to
domestic violence continue to document the failure of the judiciary to take seriously family
violence, even in the face of clear-cut statutory mandates." (citing SAUL N. WEINGART,
ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY. 87 (1989)); see
also Margaret C. Hobday, Note, A Constitutional Response to the Realities of Intimate
Violence: Minnesota's Domestic Homicide Statute, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1285. (1994)
(reporting that the notion that spousal abuse is a private matter is one of the biggest
obstacles to reform efforts).
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affairs of a husband and wife, has dramatically undercut the practical
effect of these reforms. Judges have been especially reticent to get
too involved in "family affairs." 7 Most of the recent reform efforts
have proven ineffective in curbing domestic violence, 8 and the
problem remains epidemic. 9
To Nicole Brown Simpson, the dead, we owe nothing less than
the truth.30 We owe her the certainty that the jury will hear her
story and the stories of those like her. The judicial system should aim
to provide jurors with the most relevant evidence that can be found
in a spousal homicide case-evidence describing the nature and
history of an abusive relationship. Jurors should receive historical
background information about an abusive relationship so they can
better understand the cycle of violence that leads to spousal homi-
cide.3 In cases where an abuser has killed his spouse, evidence in
the form of specific acts of abuse should be admissible to show the
propensity of the accused to abuse the victim.
32
27. Callahan, supra note 14, at 118 n.3 ("Judges are notoriously reluctant to sentence
convicted batterers to jail or prison.").
28. Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1994) (noting that
current solutions to domestic violence have not been successful enough).
29. See Callahan, supra note 14, at 118; Welch, supra note 28, at 1133: Hobday, supra
note 26, at 1286.
30. See VOLTAIRE, supra note 1, at 15.
31. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND
How SOCIETY RESPONDS 42 (1989). Dr. Walker describes the cycle of violence theory
as the abusive treatment that a battered woman experiences consisting of three different
stages: (1) the tension building stage; (2) the acute battering stage; and (3) the tension
dropping or the contrition stage. Id. For works discussing Dr. Walker's cycle of violence
theory see Dan Walkenhorst, Domestic Abuse: Curbing a Widespread Epidemic in
Missouri, 51 J. Mo. B. 9, 11 (1995); Scott Gregory Baker, Deaf Justice?: Battered Women
Unjustly Imprisoned Prior to the Enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, 24 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 99, 101-05 (1994); Christine Becker, Note, Clemency for Killers?
Pardoning Battered Women Who Strike Back, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 300 (1995);
Kimberly B. Kuhn, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony: Dunn v. Roberts, Justice
Is Done by the Expansion of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 1039,
1041-43 (1995).
32. Although there certainly are cases where abusive women murder their husbands,
this is the exception. See Deborrah Ann Klis, Reforms to Criminal Defense Instructions:
New Patterned Jury Instructions Which Account for the Experience of the Battered Woman
Who Kills Her Battering Mate, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 136 n.32 (citing Erich
D. Andersen & Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the Battered Woman
Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363, 366 (1992)) (noting that "[b]etween .20% and .64% of
battered women kill their abusive spouse or companion"). This means that of the 1.6
million to 4 million women who are abused each year, only 800 to 1000 will be charged
with the murder of an abusive spouse or companion. Consequently, this Comment will
SPOUSAL HOMICIDE
This Comment begins by discussing the origins of, and basis for,
the general rule prohibiting propensity evidence33 and the exceptions
to that rule. Part III recommends an additional exception to the
propensity rule which would make evidence of specific acts of
domestic violence or abuse admissible in spousal homicide cases.'
The proposal also suggests that jurors be allowed to consider these
acts as evidence that the defendant had a propensity to abuse his
spouse. Part IV is a case study of People v. Simpson,35 which
analyzes the court's legal basis for admitting acts of abuse by O.J.
Simpson against Nicole Brown. Part V contrasts the treatment of
prior acts of domestic violence by the court in Simpson with the
approach proposed in part III.
II. THE TRADITIONAL PROPENSITY RULE
According to apologists, the judicial system in the United States
is imperfect, but it is better than any other system in the world.
These apologists may lament the unequal ways in which minorities
and the poor are treated by the judicial system, but almost all agree
that there is no replacement for the jury system-the community
interposing itself between the awesome and immeasurable powers of
the State and the accused. In the United States the jury system
ideally presents the most desirable means for deciding factual
questions and ultimately the guilt or innocence of the accused.36
focus on the cases where the male is the defendant since the perpetrators of domestic
violence are disproportionately male. Developments, supra note 9, at 1501 n.1. "Studies
... indicate that women are... ten times as likely as men to be the victims of domestic
violence." Id. (citing LEWIS OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 39-40
(1986)). This Comment will also use male pronouns to reflect the statistical fact that men
are more likely to batter and kill their spouses. See also Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Matter
of Evidence or of Law? Battered Women Claiming Self-Defense in California, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 220 (1994) (discussing evidentiary issues in cases where a battered
spouse has killed her batterer in self-defense).
33. Generally, the propensity rule prohibits using evidence of a person's uncharged
misconduct to show the accused is a person of criminal character and is therefore more
likely to have committed the charged offense. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West
1995).
34. This determination will still be subject to the discretion of the trial judge to
exclude unduly prejudicial evidence. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995).
35. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Oct. 3, 1995).
36. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) ("Jury trial continues to receive
strong support. The laws of every State guarantee a right to jury trial in serious criminal
cases ....").
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However, there is considerable dissension over what kinds of evidence
jurors should be allowed to hear.37
As laypeople, jurors are presumed incapable of properly
determining the probative value of certain types of evidence."
Consequently, most states have adopted elaborate rules of evidence
to help assure that jurors do not hear or see evidence that might be
unduly prejudicial.3 9 Among the most controversial and oft-contest-
ed rules of evidence are those relating to the admissibility of character
evidence.'
37. See Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical
Interaction Between Personality and Situation, 43 DUKE L.J. 816 (1994) (arguing against
the admissibility of character impeachment evidence); Miguel A. Mdndez & Edward J.
Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt. The California Supreme Court's About-Face on the Plan
Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 28 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 473 (1994) [hereinafter M~ndez & Imwinkelried, About Face] (arguing that use of
the plan theory for introducing the accused's misconduct should be curtailed); Edward G.
Mascolo, Uncharged-Misconduct Evidence and the Issue of Intent. Limiting the Need for
Admissibility, 67 CONN. BJ. 281 (1993) (arguing accused should be allowed to remove
element of intent from case by stipulation, thereby avoiding introduction of prejudicial
uncharged misconduct evidence). But see Stuart H. Baggish & Christopher 0. Frey,
Domestic Physical Abuse: A Proposed Use for Evidence of Specific Similar Acts in
Criminal Prosecutions to Corroborate Victim Testimony, 68 FLA. BJ. 57 (1994) (proposing
that use of collateral act evidence should be expanded in domestic violence cases); Hank
M. Goldberg, Proposition 8. A Prosecutor's Perspective, 23 PAC. L.J. 947 (1992)
[hereinafter Goldberg, Prosecutor's Perspective] (suggesting that courts and prosecutors
have failed to make arguments based on Proposition 8); Hank M. Goldberg, The Impact
of Proposition 8 on Prior Misconduct Impeachment Evidence in California Criminal Cases,
24 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 621, 622 (1991) (applauding Proposition 8's amendment of the
character evidence rules as bringing California into line with the majority ofjurisdictions).
38. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("[R]elevant evidence can confuse, or worse, mislead the trier of
fact [who] is not properly equipped to judge the probative worth of the evidence.").
39. See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5005 (1977) (giving a comprehensive history of efforts to
codify the rules of evidence in the states and the influence of those efforts on the Federal
Rules of Evidence); see also Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That Is the
Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV.
641, 642 n.2 (1992) ("New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts
and Virginia are the only remaining states without evidence codes.").
40. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, 1 CRIM. JUST. 6, 7 (1986)
[hereinafter Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct] ("Not only is the admissibility of
uncharged misconduct ... the most important evidentiary issue in contemporary criminal
practice, it is also among the most misunderstood."); see also Alma G. Lopez, New Jersey's
Other-Crimes Rule and the Evidence Committee's Abrogation of Almost Two Hundred
Years of Judicial Precedent, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 394, 394 (1993) ("The introduction
of extrinsic evidence of a'defendant's other crimes, wrongs and acts is one of the most
important and controversial means of proof in the resolution of criminal ... disputes.").
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Character evidence is generally offered in three ways:4' (1) as
testimony about a person's reputation;42 (2) as opinion testimony
about a person's character from a witness familiar with the accused;43
and (3) as "evidence of specific instances of a person's conduct that
tend circumstantially to reveal that person's character."'  It is the
manner in which California courts treat this third type of character
evidence-commonly called circumstantial character evidence-that
will be the central focus of this Comment.
A. The Traditional Basis for Excluding Uncharged Misconduct
When Offered to Prove the Guilt of the Accused
Since the 17th century, the common law has deemed evidence of
a person's uncharged misconduct inadmissible to demonstrate a
propensity for criminal behavior.45 During the late 18th century,
American courts adopted the English rule and began excluding such
evidence. 6 By the middle of the 19th century, California courts
were also applying the rule.47 This prohibition prevents prosecutors
from introducing evidence of an accused's past crimes or bad acts to
suggest the accused has a bad character and acted in conformity with
that character in committing the charged crimes.' The rule bolsters
the presumption of innocence by ensuring that criminal trials focus on
the commission of acts charged by the State and not the character of
the accused.49 The Supreme Court has lifted this principle to a
constitutional level by holding that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment precludes legisla-
tures and courts from criminalizing a person's status.50
41. David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 305, 306 (1995).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 306-07.
44. Id. at 307.
45. Mascolo, supra note 37, at 283-84 (observing that "[t]he rule originated in England
in the late seventeenth century as a procedural device for countering the inquisitorial
practices of the Star Chamber").
46. Id. at 284; Leonard, supra note 41, at 308.
47. Edward J. Imwinkelried & Miguel A. Mdndez, Resurrecting California's Old Law
on Character Evidence, 23 PAc. LU. 1005, 1041 (1992) [hereinafter Imwinkelried &
Mdndez, Character Evidence).
48. People v. Felix, 14 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1004, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 117 (1993)
("Evidence of prior offenses is not admissible simply as character evidence . .
49. Mascolo, supra note 37, at 285.
50. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); see also Mdndez &
Imwinkelried, Character Evidence, supra note 47, at 1045-46 (discussing constitutionality
January 1996]
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Several rationales support the traditional exclusion of uncharged
misconduct evidence. There is a concern that such evidence will
cause the jury to concentrate on the character of the defendant and
decide the case on an improper basis. t Rather than convicting the
defendant based on the evidence presented, the jury may convict the
defendant because they believe he is a bad person and deserves to be
punished;" or because they believe even if he is not guilty of the
present charge, surely he has done something bad in the past which
warrants incapacitating him now.53 "There is [also] a fear that if too
many prior bad acts are introduced against the defendant, the jury
will simply conclude that because he was bad before he must have
committed the crime in this case."'54 Another worry is that jurors
will overvalue the probative weight of the evidence showing the
defendant's bid character.5 Earlier concerns voiced by McCormick
and Wigmore also discuss the undue amount of time character
evidence and accompanying rebuttal evidence tend to consume. 6
B. California Evidence Code Section 1101: The
Modern Propensity Rule
The common law rules concerning character evidence are now
codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence57 and in most states."
California Evidence Code section 1101"9 codified the traditional,
common law prohibition on the use of character evidence and governs
of Proposition 8 and suggesting that the common law ban on character evidence may have
survived Proposition 8's purported change to these rules).
51. See Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, supra note 40, at 8; Mdndez &
Imwinkelried, About Face, supra note 37, at 474: Imwinkelried & Mrndez, Character
Evidence, supra note 47, at 1007.
52. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, supra note 40, at 8.
53. 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (1983)
[hereinafter WIGMORE].
54. Laurie L. Levenson, Abuse by Any Other Name: The Admissibility of Domestic
Violence Evidence in the Simpson Case, at *1, Jan. 9, 1995, available in WESTLAW, O.J.
Comm. database.
55. Id. at :'2.
56. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 185; WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 58.2.
57. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show [action] in conformity therewith.").
58. Imwinkelried & Mndez, Character Evidence, supra note 47, at 1008 ("The rule
prohibiting use of character evidence to prove an accused's guilt has been followed in a
substantially similar form in all American jurisdictions.").
59. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1995).
[Vol. 29:939
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the admissibility of character evidence.' Specific acts of the accused
cannot be offered to show he acted in conformity with his character6
in committing the act for which he now stands accused.62 However,
it is acknowledged that a person's recent63 and past behavior can be
highly relevant.' The legislature has balanced the need for such
evidence against the accused's right to a fair trial by allowing specific
acts of the accused to be admitted in certain limited circumstances,
65
as when such acts are relevant to prove a material fact.'
California law allows the admission of specific acts against the
accused "when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident ... ) other than his disposition to commit such
acts."'67 Judges have the discretion to limit the impact of these
exceptions by excluding unduly prejudicial character evidence.' This
process of weighing the relative probative values of prohibited
60. California Evidence Code § 1101(a) provides: "[Elvidence of a person's character
or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when
offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a)
(West 1995).
61. Id.; People v. Fletcher, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1667, 1687, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 190
(1994), review granted, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823, 891 P.2d 803 (1995).
62. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a).
63. United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085,1094 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 705 F.2d
603 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d
1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); see Imwinkelried, Uncharged
Misconduct, supra note 40, at 8 (concluding that "there should be no rigid requirement
that the uncharged misconduct antedate the charged crime").
64. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) ("[character evidence] is
said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with
a bad general record.. ."); see Mascolo, supra note 37, at 285-86.
65. Huey L. Golden, Knowledge, Intent, System, and Motive: A Much Needed Return
to the Requirement of Independent Relevance, 55 LA. L. REV. 179, 179-80 (1994) (noting
balance struck between relevant character evidence and prejudice to defendant by
exceptions to rule against propensity evidence).
66. People v. Terry, 38 Cal. App. 3d 432,446, 113 Cal. Rptr. 233,242 (1974); see David
Ring, Comment, Rush to Judgment: Criminal Propensity Clothed as Credibility Evidence
in the Post-Proposition 8 Era of California Criminal Law, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 241, 242
(1994).
67. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1995); see also Baggish & Frey, supra note 37,
at 59-60 (arguing that circumstantial character evidence should be admissible to prove any
material fact other than a defendant's propensity to commit crimes); Leonard, supra note
41, at 307 (stating that "when character is 'in issue,' evidence rules admit character
evidence essentially without limitation").
68. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1995); People v. Long, 7 Cal. App. 3d 586,590, 86
Cal. Rptr. 590, 592 (1970); see infra part IV.
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propensity evidence against the permissible use of such evidence
under one of the exceptions has been called "one of the most difficult
analyses in the law of evidence."'69
These exceptions allowing for the limited admissibility of
character evidence have spawned a wealth of criticism throughout the
United States.70 Critics feel the exceptions have swallowed the rule,
leaving little restraint on the introduction of uncharged misconductt
In actuality, a clever prosecutor can easily find a way to fit a prior act
into one of these "recognized pigeonholes,"' especially since many
of the exceptions, such as identity, intent, knowledge, preparation, or
plan are, or could be, elements of a criminal offense.73 The remain-
ing exceptions usually play an important part in any criminal
prosecution, showing the defendant's motive, opportunity to commit
the crime, and the absence of mistake.74 Thus, "prosecutors often
shape their case theory to ensure the admission of uncharged
misconduct evidence." 75
Judges are free to approve any logically relevant theory for
admitting evidence, since the statutory prohibition is not limited to
the enumerated categories.76 In order to get evidence of uncharged
69. Gerard A. Rault, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Evidence, 37 LOY. L. REV. 725, 727
(1991). See Lopez, supra note 40, at 394.
70. See Golden, supra note 65, at 215 (arguing that the required showing of
independent relevance of specific acts should be more rigorously enforced); lmwinkelried,
Uncharged Misconduct, supra note 40, at 9 (suggesting the courts have erred in their
application of the logical relevance theory and have admitted evidence which was only
probative of an accused's bad character); Ring, supra note 66, at 262-64 (arguing that
criminal propensity evidence is being disguised as credibility evidence and eroding our
sense of justice).
71. Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), 70 IOwA L. REV. 579, 579-80 (1985).
72. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, supra note 40, at 8.
73. Golden, supra note 65, at 183; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct:
What Would Irving Younger Have Done?, LITIG., Fall 1989, at 6, 7 [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, Younger] (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and arguing that it gives
prosecutors room to maneuver by allowing them to use "noncharacter theories of
relevance to justify admission of evidence of uncharged crimes").
74. Golden, supra note 65, at 183.
75. Imwinkelried, Younger, supra note 73, at 7.
76. People v. Carter, 19 Cal. App. 4th 1236, 1246, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 894 (1993)
(For uncharged offenses to be material so as to be admissible, the "evidence need only
tend to prove or disprove some fact in issue."); see Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct,
supra note 40,.at 9 ("The trend in the case law is toward [permitting] the introduction of
uncharged misconduct for any purpose other than proving the defendant's bad character
[regarding Rule,404(b)] . ... The words, 'such as,' manifest an intent that the list be
illustrative rather than exhaustive."); see also T.M. Ringer, Jr., A Six Step Analysis of
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misconduct admitted, the prosecution need only establish that the fact
to be proved is material, that the uncharged misconduct tends to
prove that fact, and that there is no other rule or policy mandating
exclusion of the evidence77 However, a trial judge's discretion in
this regard must constantly endure appellate scrutiny. The rules on
character evidence provide the basis for a majority of all criminal
appeals.
7 8
This issue is commonly appealed because evidence of a defen-
dant's uncharged misconduct simultaneously has tremendous
probative value79 and great potential to "tip the balance against the
defendant."8  Some argue that no other type of evidence can be
more determinative of the outcome of a trial." Consequently,
proponents of the propensity rule advocate rigid enforcement of the
rule's strictures to prevent the undue admission of a defendant's
antisocial acts. 2 These commentators argue that the manner in
which the exceptions are construed makes the prohibition on
propensity evidence superfluous.' On the other hand, their oppo-
nents assert that the propensity rule prevents jurors from receiving
highly probative evidence,' thereby allowing a certain number of
"Other Purposes" Evidence Pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. (1995) (discussing method for determining the logical
relevance of uncharged misconduct).
77. People v. Tapia, 25 Cal. App. 4th 984, 1021, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851, 871 (1994)
(citing People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303,315,611 P.2d 883, 888, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289,294
(1980)).
78. See M~ndez & Imwinkelried, About Face, supra note 37, at 474-75 (noting that the
admissibility of uncharged misconduct is the most commonly litigated evidentiary issue on
appeal and that Section 404(b) generates more published appeals than any other provision
of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
79. Lopez, supra note 40, at 394.
80. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct, supra note 40, at 8; see People v. Dablon,
34 Cal. App. 4th 372, 379-82, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761, 765-66 (1994), rev. granted, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 258 (1995).
81. Weissenberger, supra note 71, at 579 (commenting that the frequency of admission
of specific acts indicates that exclusion may be the exception rather than the rule).
82. Golden, supra note 65, at 215.
83. Mascolo, supra note 37, at 297 ("[A] trial judge must be vigilant to ensure that the
intent exception does not emasculate the propensity rule.").
84. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct. Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845 (1982) (arguing that there should be
no limit on the introduction of character evidence except Federal Rule of Evidence 403);
jee also Levenson, supra note 54, at *1 ("The public is waiting to see whether the jury will
be given the 'whole story' about Simpson and his relationship with his wife or whether,
through its rules of evidence, the criminal justice system will sanitize the case. for the
jury.").
950 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
criminals to go free." Some of these critics have called for a
reevaluation of the character evidence rules in certain cases.86
III. A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCEPTION TO THE PROPENSITY
RULE IN SPOUSAL HOMICIDE CASES
A. The Proposal
This Comment proposes an exception to the propensity rule in
addition to those already enumerated in California Evidence Code
section 1101(b). This exception would only apply in spousal
homicide cases where the defendant had physically abused the victim
in the ten years prior to the alleged murder.' This new exception
would allow the use of specific acts of violence or physical abuse to
show the propensity of the accused to abuse the victim. Jurors would
be allowed to consider prior acts of abuse as evidence that the
defendant had a tendency to abuse his spouse. Evidence of prior
physical abuse would be relevant as it tended to show a pattern of
abuse by the defendant against the particular victim.
In order to establish a pattern of abuse, the prosecution would be
required to show evidence of at least two incidents of domestic
violence during the previous ten years.' The definition of spouse
would include: spouses, former spouses, persons who are presently
residing together or who have resided together in the past, persons
who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been
married or have lived together at any time, and a man and woman if
the woman is pregnant and the man is alleged to be the father
regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together
at any time. However, the definition does not include intimate
85. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases,
78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 565 (1994).
86. See infra part III.C.
87. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1995). For a listing of the statutory exceptions
see supra notes 57-62, and accompanying text.
88. Limiting the exception to cases where the defendant had abused the victim within
the previous ten-year period would assure that any abuse evidence would be probative and
not tenuous due to the passage of time.
89. See Hobday, supra note 26, at 1311 (describing a Minnesota domestic homicide
statute requiring prosecutors to establish a pattern of abuse by proving at least two
incidents occurred that fit the definition of domestic abuse). Hobday notes that requiring
"a specific number of incidents would also focus too heavily on each isolated act of
violence rather than attacking the abusive pattern of conduct." Id.
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partners who have not resided together, if the relationship did not
involve having a child."°
B. Rationale
This proposal is based on recent character evidence reforms
undertaken in Missouri9' and by Congress.92 These new laws allow
the admission of prior acts of sexual abuse to show the defendant's
criminal propensity. These laws codify the so-called "depraved sexual
instinct" exception, which allows evidence of prior crimes to be
admitted in sexual assault and child abuse cases where the defendant
has abused the same victim previously.93
Three commonly cited rationales endorse admitting evidence of
the prior acts of the defendant in child and sexual abuse cases.94
First, prior sexual misconduct is not offered into evidence to show a
general propensity for crime but only to demonstrate a propensity
toward' criminal activity with the same person.95  Second, the
existence of similar crimes is probative of a continuing relationship
between the defendant and the victim, making repetition of the crime
more likely.96 Third, "evidence of a lewd disposition ... provid[es]
necessary background information to explain and give credence to the
victim's testimony."'97
90. This definition is based on the definition of family member in Minnesota's
Domestic Abuse Act. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(2)(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995).
91. Missouri adopted the following statute dealing with uncharged acts in 1995:
"evidence that the defendant has committed other ... uncharged crimes involving victims
under fourteen years of age shall be admissible for the purpose of showing the propensity
of the defendant to commit the crime ... with which he is charged." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 566.025 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
92. This proposal is similar to the recently adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 413(a)
which reads: "In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant." FED. R. EvID. 413.
93. People v. Salazar, 144 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 193 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1983) ("In sex
offense cases, our Supreme Court has set forth a less stringent test for the admission of
evidence of uncharged offenses [when the prior offenses].., are committed upon persons
similar to the prosecuting witness." (quoting People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 573 P.2d
433, 143 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978))); see also Golden, supra note 65, at 213 (describing the
"Depraved Sexual Instinct" exception as an unenumerated exception to Louisiana's
character evidence rules accepted by the Louisiana courts).
94. Golden, supra note 65, at 213.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Each of these rationales equally support admitting prior evidence
of abuse in a spousal homicide case. Prior acts of physical abuse
would not be offered to show a general propensity for crime or
violence but to demonstrate a propensity toward abusing the same
victim. 8 Next, the existence of a pattern of abuse is probative of the
nature of the continuing relationship between the defendant and his
spouse, which makes repetition of the crime particularly likely.
Evidence of a pattern of abuse provides necessary background
information about the nature and quality of the relationship. Most
importantly, since the victim is not available to testify in a spousal
homicide case, admitting evidence of abuse may be the only way to
get this information before the jury."
C. Justification
Evidence code reform seems to be an inappropriate way to deal
with the problem of spousal homicide. Since evidence law only
regulates the admissibility of evidence at a trial, a change in the
evidence code appears to be too late to save a victim of spousal
homicide. However, a reform proposal is not -meant to simply be a
plug in a leaky dam.
Several justifications support this proposed change in the
character evidence rules: (1) creating a statutory basis for admitting
abuse evidence will assure that jurors hear this evidence; (2) jurors
will better understand the dynamics of an abusive relationship if they
know about a history of the violence in the relationship; (3) the public
is becoming increasingly concerned about crime and is more willing
to decrease the procedural rights of criminal defendants to obtain
convictions and deterrence; and (4) admitting abuse evidence will
deter domestic violence and spousal homicide by assuring that
98. Id.; see also People v. Yarbrough, 37 Cal. App. 3d 454,458, 112 Cal. Rptr. 391,393
(holding that "where defendant denied any beating at all, it was not improper for the trial
court to admit evidence which went to show prior beatings of same person").
99. In spousal homicide cases, the absence of the victim's testimony can be
problematic if there are no other witnesses to corroborate allegations of abuse. In such
a case, the defendant may get a "free ride" and the jury will not hear any evidence of
abuse. See People v. Zack, 184 Cal. App. 3d 409, 415, 229 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1986)
("Appellant was not entitled to have the jury determine his guilt or innocence on a false
presentation that his and the victim's relationship and their parting were peaceful and
friendly."); see- also Baggish &Frey, supra note 37, at 59 (arguing that past acts of abuse
should be admissible to corroborate victim testimony in domestic violence cases).
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batterers will have their abuse exposed and used against them-in a
public trial if they murder their spouses.
1. Making a specific exception for abuse evidence in spousal
homicide cases will assure that jurors hear such evidence
Although it may not seem difficult for a prosecutor to get prior
abuse evidence admitted," there is no assurance that jurors will be
allowed to hear of a batterer's abusive past in a spousal homicide
case. Carving out a small exception in the evidence code for spousal
homicide cases is a sensible way to include abuse evidence without
having to overhaul the entire body of character evidence law.
Because this evidence tends to be prejudicial, it is possible that some
judges might exclude it altogether for fear of being overturned on
appeal. 01
Providing explicit statutory authority for the admission of abuse
evidence will make it easier for trial judges to admit such evidence.
Currently, judges may admit abuse evidence if it relates to a material
issue, 2 but they may not admit it for its own sake. Including this
exception in the evidence code acknowledges the importance of abuse
evidence and shows that it must be presented to give the victim a fair
trial. 3 The courts can be instrumental in preventing domestic
violence"° if judges have greater discretion to introduce an abusive
spouse's battering history to a jury in a spousal homicide case.
100. See discussion supra part II.B.
101. People v. Deeney, 145 Cal. App. 3d 647, 654, 193 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (1983)
(holding that in an involuntary manslaughter case, the trial court improperly admitted
evidence indicating the defendant's abuse of the victim since the evidence did not reveal
any common features between defendant's prior acts and the victim's death which would
identify defendant as the victim's murderer).
102. See discussion supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
103. Baggish & Frey, supra note 37, at 59 ("Something which seems often forgotten is
that, in criminal cases, the victim [the State], too, is entitled to a fair trial. This entitlement
is lost, however, in the judicially created vacuum of existing law pertaining to evidence of
specific collateral acts.") (footnote omitted).
104. Judge Lynn Tepper, The Court's Role in Ending Family Violence, 68 FLA. B.J. 30,
32 (1994) (suggesting that judges should recognize that signs of domestic violence appear
in all kinds of cases and thatjudges should look more closely at the behavior of the people
before them to see if such behavior is indicative of prior exposure to domestic violence).
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2. Jurors must be allowed to hear abuse evidence to understand
the dynamics of an abusive relationship
Allowing jurors to hear abuse evidence gives them a valuable
history of the relationship between the accused and the victim of a
spousal homicide. Describing the pattern of violent behavior over
time is necessary to help jurors understand the nature of the domestic
violence environment experienced by the victim. 5  Bringing this
evidence before juries will help to dispel the myths and stereotypes
that have clouded beliefs about domestic violence."°
A common belief about domestic violence is that leaving the
batterer will increase the woman's safety. Jurors may find it difficult
to understand why women do not leave abusive relationships before
they are killed.0 7 However, "[a]t the point that separation (or the
decision to separate) occurs, the risk of violence to the battered
woman increases, a phenomena referred to as 'separation abuse.' ,,'W
Contrary to common belief battered women are more likely to be
killed by their spouse after having left the relationship."°9
For further evidence that jurors can have serious misconceptions
about domestic violence, one need only examine the attitudes of some
of the prospective jurors in the Simpson case. When asked in juror
questionnaires to speculate on the causes of domestic violence, jurors
responded with answers reflecting common myths about domestic
violence: juror 462 felt "[d]omestic violence [is] a family matter,""'
juror 19's answer reflected the belief that "[d]omestic violence is a
minor family problem and that there are no significant issues
surrounding domestic violence,""' and juror 620's answer suggested
that "[d]omestic violence only occurs in certain lower-class house-
105. Mary Ann Dutton, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence: Understanding the
Response from Battered Women, 68 FLA. BJ. 24, 24 (1994).
106. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 19-31 (1979) (describing twenty-one
common myths about domestic violence); see also Developments, supra note 9, at 1502-03
(stating that stereotypes and misconceptions about domestic violence must be exorcised
for the law to adequately address the problems raised by domestic violence).
107. Cf Dutton, supra note 105, at 24 ("Recognizing that a woman may be battered
requires an understanding of the range of violence and abuse to which she may have been
exposed ....").
108. Id. at 26 (citing M.R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991)).
109. BROWNE, supra note 18, at 144.
110. People's Response, supra note 4, at *33.
111. Id. at *34.
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holds."' 2 Allowing jurors to deliberate and render a verdict based
upon these common misconceptions regarding domestic violence
increases the likelihood that a grave injustice can occur."3  To
prevent these misconceptions from prejudicing juror decisions, jurors
must be allowed to hear evidence of abuse coupled with expert
testimony."4 Expert testimony explains the significance of a pattern
of violence and links it to known and proven theories about the
behavior of batterers.' '5 This framework will help jurors understand
how murder may be the inevitable result of an escalating cycle of
violence." 6
3. Public concern about crime has decreased tolerance
for the procedural rights of criminals
Reform efforts do not always garner approval from the academic
community,"7 but this lack of support may be immaterial. Legisla-
tors, and the public through the initiative process, have shown a
willingness to go forward with new crime-fighting laws, regardless of
the dire consequences for criminal defendants predicted by academ-
ics."' Unsatisfied with the ability of the criminal justice system to
deter crime in California, voters have repeatedly gone to the polls to
express their disaffection. In 1990 California voters adopted
Proposition 115 which approved the admission of hearsay evidence at
112. Id.
113. People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 409, 419, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 925 (1992).
114. Callahan, supra note 14, at 121.
115. Hobday, supra note 26, at 1300.
116. BROWNE, supra note 18, at 5 ("Familial homicide, in which victim and assailant
are related by blood or marriage, is a common sequel to domestic violence. In 1984,
two-thirds of all interspousal killings resulted in the death of the woman.").
117. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the
American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off
on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 285,288 (1995) (arguing that Congress and the
Missouri legislature have chosen a bad place to start a reform of the character evidence
rules); Leonard, supra note 41, at 310-12 (arguing that the amendment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to allow the admission of past acts of sexual assault and child
molestation is unwise).
118. Even though Proposition 8, proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 413(a), and
Proposition 184, the "Three Strikes" law, faced opposition from the defense bar and the
academic community, they were all enacted anyway. Victor Sze, Comment, A Tale of
Three Strikes: Slogan Triumphs Over Substance As Our Bumper-Sticker Mentality Comes
Home to Roost, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1047, 1049-50 (1995) (criticizing the adoption of
Proposition 184 by the voters in the face of charges that it was poorly drafted); see infra
notes 133-34.
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preliminary hearings."9  California voters again showed their
concern about crime in 1994 as they adopted the "three strikes"
initiative by an overwhelming seventy-two percent margin.
20
General expressions of public sentiment reflect the perception
that crime is one of the more significant problems facing society.
21
Public opinion polls conducted over the last four years reveal an
unwavering public commitment to crime reduction." With
119. Eleanor Swift, Does It Matter Who Is in Charge of Evidence Law?, 25 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 649, 651-52 (1992) (Proposition 115 also created a "law officer" exception to the
hearsay rule which authorized holding criminal defendants to answer on felony charges
based upon hearsay statements made to police officers.).
120. Sze, supra note 118, at 1057.
121. Imwinkelried, supra note 117, at 294 ("In a... September 1994 poll conducted by
the Wirthlin Group, 61% of the respondents stated that crime is a serious problem in the
United States." (citations omitted)); see also id. at 297 (A 1989 study conducted by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, surveying 60,000 adults, concluded that homicide was perceived
as the most serious crime. (citations omitted)).
122. The following statistics are the results of various national telephone surveys about
crime conducted between 1991 and 1995. The information in these surveys was taken from
the Roper Center for Public Opinion's Poll-C Westlaw database.
In a survey conducted by ABC News & the Washington Post on March 19,1995,1524
respondents were asked to'name the most important problem facing this country. The
leading response was crime at 18%.
In a survey conducted by The Roper Center for Public Opinion for the L.A. Times
on January .22, 1995, 1353 respondents were asked which version of the 1994 crime bill
they preferred: The original bill which had money for crime prevention programs, or a
revised bill with nocrime prevention funds. Of those polled, 72% favored the original bill,
while only 20% favored the bill with no funds.
In a survey conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror on
March 21, 1994, 2001 respondents were asked to identify the most important problem
facing their local community. From a list of 20 possible responses, crime/violence led all
responses at 29%.
In a survey conducted by Hart and Teeter Research Companies for NBC News & The
Wall Street Journal on January 18, 1994, 1009 respondents were asked which of the
following statements came closest to their point of view: (A) it will be possible to reduce
violent crime by making changes in the current criminal justice system; (B) it will not be
possible to reduce violence without a complete overhaul of our current criminal justice
system. Of those polled, 37% responded it was possible with changes, 58% felt it would
not be possible without a complete overhaul.
In a survey conducted by the Wirthlin Group on December 9, 1993, 1013 respondents
were asked whether the federal government should spend more or should spend less on
certain federal programs even if it increased their taxes. Of those polled, 64% thought
more should be spent on crime prevention, even if it meant an increase in their personal
tax burden. While 18% thought more should be spent to prevent crime if it did not
increase taxes, only 10% thought less should be spent on crime prevention.
In a survey conducted by Gordon S. Black Corporation for USA Today on December
10, 1991, 806 respondents were asked whether certain positions a presidential candidate
might take would make them more or less likely to vote for the candidate. Of those
responding, 64% said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who would spend
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anticrime fervor running rampant, I 3' the public seems ready to run
the risk that jurors could convict criminal defendants based on their
criminal history in spite of a lack of evidence supporting a convic-
tion. 24 In past years, the public has embraced evidence code
reform as an acceptable method for reducing crime. While these
new laws have been criticized as unfair,126 society's willingness to
accept the costs of admitting possibly prejudicial evidence to achieve
deterrence and convictions is obvious. As crime continues to be an
important concern it is plausible that evidence code reform should
once again be considered.
4. Admitting abuse evidence will help deter spousal homicide and
domestic violence
Allowing abuse evidence to become a part of spousal homicide
cases will help deter abusers. Allowing prior abuse evidence in
spousal homicide cases would make recidivists hesitate; they would
know that if tried, they would be more likely to be convicted because
of the freer admissibility of their prior misconduct. Furthermore,
assuring that an abuser's battering history is subject to public scrutiny
may also make a batterer think twice before he abuses. Once an
abuser knows that he will not be able to hide his abuse forever, he
may be more reluctant to abuse his spouse.
Although there is no guarantee that this proposal will have any
effect on deterring spousal homicide or domestic violence, it may
effect some or even one person. If one woman is spared from one
beating, or if one woman's life is saved, then this proposal would be
worthy of enactment by the California Legislature.
more on rehabilitation and crime prevention and less on jails. Only 21% said this stance
would make them less likely to vote for the candidate.
123. See Sze, supra note 118, at 1053 (noting the public fury surrounding the adoption
of the so-called Three Strikes initiative).
124. Imwinkelried, supra note 117, at 296-97.
125. For example, California voters accepted Proposition 8's evidence reforms in 1982
as a means to promote victims' rights over the procedural rights of criminal defendants.
See infra note 131.
126. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES, Feb.
9, 1995, available in WESTLAW, U.S.-Orders database; see Imwinkelried, supra note 117,
at 288; Leonard, supra note 41, at 306.
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D. Response to Potential Criticism
There continues to be vigorous and vocal support for strict
regulation of the use of character evidence. 27 These supporters feel
there is no reason to change 21 the character evidence rules because
the traditional rationales for these rules are as valid as when the rules
were adopted.2 9  They argue vigorously that any relaxation of the
rule will lead to unjust convictions. 3 Consequently, any proposal
to alter such a traditional tenet of evidence jurisprudence will
undoubtedly meet with skepticism. In 1982 the adoption of Proposi-
tion 8'13 proposed to alter the character evidence rules. 32  Prior
to its enactment, Proposition 8 generated considerable debate 33 and
has since faced continued criticism."M As it turns out, Proposition
8 did not have the drastic and dire effect once predicted, 35 suggest-
ing that the opponents of character evidence reform may be overly
cautious. Unlike Proposition 8 which seemed to be a complete
127. See Golden, supra note 65, at 213-15, Imwinkelried & M6ndez, Character Evidence,
note 47, at 1043-45; Leonard. supra note 41, at 342; Mascolo, supra note 37, at 281; Miguel
Angel Mdndez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352
and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1044-60 (1984).
128. Golden, supra note 65, at 215.
129. Id. at 213.
130. See M6ndez & Imwinkelried, About Face, supra note 37, at 475-76; Ring, supra
note 66, at 246.
131. Proposition 8 was a referendum adopted by the voters of California in 1982
amending the California Constitution. Swift, supra note 119, at 650. The part of
Proposition 8 most relevant to this paper is the so-called "Right to Truth-in-Evidence"
provision which proposed to make all relevant evidence admissible in criminal trials. Id.
132. The California Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Relevant evidence shall
not be excluded in any criminal proceeding .... Nothing in this section shall affect any
existing statutory or constitutional rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or
Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103." CAL CONsT. art. I, § 28(d).
133. See Swift, supra note 119, at 652-57 (discussing the arguments marshalled for and
against Proposition 8).
134. See Imwinkelried & Mdndez, Character Evidence, supra note 47, at 1046-49
(arguing that Proposition 8 was ill-conceived); Goldberg, Prosecutor's Perspective, supra
note 37, at 964 (expressing amazement that the validity of § 1101 was still in question ten
years after the adoption of Proposition 8); M6ndez, supra note 127, at 1016 (arguing that
Proposition 8 will undermine the rationales for the common law character evidence rules);
Ring, supra note 66, at 268-69 (suggesting that Proposition 8 is overly broad and threatens
personal liberty); Swift, supra note 119, at 660 (criticizing the amendment of the evidence
code through the initiative process in the case of Propositions 8 and 115).
135. See Imwinkelried & M6ndez, Character Evidence, supra note 47, at 1012
(concluding that the California Supreme Court has actually reinstated the old character
evidence rules through its interpretation of the provisions of Proposition 8).
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overhaul of the character evidence rules,'36 the current proposal
affects only a small number of cases 37 and only changes the way in
which jurors can consider one kind of evidence. This proposal does
not allow the introduction of evidence that is currently inadmissi-
ble.'38 It may settle this area of the law by codifying the right of the
state to introduce evidence of abuse in a spousal homicide case, but
it will not result in the admission of any currently inadmissible abuse
evidence.
Critics will argue that allowing jurors to hear evidence about past
abuse will direct their attention to the defendant's character and lead
them to conclude that because the defendant abused his spouse he is
a bad person and is more likely to commit criminal acts. Jurors are
no more likely to draw this impermissible inference under the
suggested proposal then they are under the current rules. The abuse
evidence, if offered, would be limited by a jury instruction directing
jurors to consider the abuse evidence only as it tended to show the
defendant's propensity, if any, to abuse his spouse. Jurors could still
be allowed to consider incidents of abuse as they related to motive,
intent, identity, and so on, but they would receive strict instructions
not to consider the evidence for any other purpose.
39
Critics may also suggest that concentrating on the past acts of a
person will result in an inordinate amount of time spent arguing
whether a past act occurred. The time factor is not a concern under
the new proposal, however, because evidence of spousal abuse is
already admissible. 40 The proposal will not change the length of an
136. See supra note 131.
137. Walkenhorst, supra note 31, at 10 ("20 percent of all murders in this country are
committed within the family, 13 percent of which are committed by spouses.").
138. See infra parts IV-V.
139. The proposed instruction would read something like this:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant
committed [a crime] [crimes] other than that for which [he] [she] is on trial.
Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you
to prove that defendant is a person of bad character or that [he] [she] has a
disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence was received and may be
considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to
show: [a propensity of the defendant to physically abuse his spouse.] Now, for
the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh
it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. You are not
permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose.
This instruction is based on the California Jury Instructions used in criminal cases.
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCrIONS: CRIMINAL (CALJIC) No. 250 (5th ed. 1988)
[hereinafter CALJIC]; see infra note 169.
140. See infra parts IV-V.
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admissibility hearing or increase the amount of evidence presented to
a jury. It would only alter the scope of jurors' consideration of abuse
evidence.
IV. A CASE STUDY: PEOPLE V. SIMPSON
On January 11, 1995, in one of the most important motions in the
trial of O.J. Simpson, 4' Judge Lance Ito began hearing a defense
motion to exclude evidence of "domestic discord."'' 42 The motion
categorized evidence of O.J.'s past abuse of Nicole as inadmissible
propensity evidence. 43 The defense argued the evidence was being
used to show that-O.J. was disposed to commit murder because he
had abused his wife in the past.'44 Since evidence of prior acts
cannot be used to show propensity, 4- the defense argued that O.J.'s
abuse of Nicole was only admissible if offered to establish a material
fact. 46  Anticipating the People's arguments for admitting these
acts, the defense asserted that O.J.'s prior acts could not be admitted
to show identity, intent, motive, common plan or scheme,'47 and
requested the exclusion of the evidence because it was more
prejudicial than probative.'
The People's response to this motion contained an exhaustive
twelve-page listing of numerous incidents of abuse or misconduct by
O.J. against Nicole. 49 In a somewhat novel approach, the prosecu-
tion argued for the introduction of this evidence, claiming it should be
admitted to give the jury an idea of what the relationship between
O.J. and Nicole was really like. 50 Before arguing that these prior
141. Levenson, supra note 54, at *1 ("The hearing on the motion is important because
it will force society to confront the realities of domestic violence and its horrible
potential.").
142. CNN: Text of O.J. Simpson Hearing-Part 8 (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 11,
1995).
143. Defendant's In Limine Motion to Exclude Evidence of Domestic Discord at *11,
People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1994 WL 737962 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Dec. 14,
1994) [hereinafter Domestic Discord]. This motion also sought to exclude certain hearsay
statements by Nicole Brown and evidence showing OJ. Simpson stalked Nicole Brown on
numerous occasions. Id. at *22-*23. This part of the motion will not be analyzed here as
it is outside the scope of this Comment.
144. Id. at *11.
145. CAL. EVD. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1995).
146. Domestic Discord, supra note 143, at *10.
147. Id. at *11-*18.
148. Id. at *21-*22.
149. People's Response, supra note 4, at *5-*16.
150. Susan B. Jordan, What's Going on Here? The Hearings on Domestic Violence, at
[Vol. 29:939
SPOUSAL HOMICIDE
acts were admissible on statutory grounds the People pointed out a
special rule in relationship violence cases allowing for the admissibility
of "abuse and control evidence.''. The People went on to argue
that the abuse and control evidence was also admissible under
California Evidence Code section 1101 to show the' defendant's
motive, intent, identity, and his plan to control Nicole Brown
Simpson.52
The court ruled'53 that the prosecution could introduce seven
incidents of prior assaultive conduct by O.J. Simpson against Nicole
Brown Simpson relating to motive, intent, plan, and identity.54
Each incident was relevant as part of a pattern of conduct by the
defendant and an incident of physical violence against Nicole Brown
Simpson.55 In support of its ruling, the court cited People v.
Zack,"'56 which provides a clear rule for guiding trial courts in
admitting prior abuse evidence:
From these precedents, as well as common sense, experi-
ence, and logic, we distill the following rule: Where a
defendant is charged with a violent crime and has or had a
previous relationship with a victim, prior assaults upon the-
same victim, when offered on disputed issues, e.g., identity,
intent, motive, et cetera, are admissible based solely upon
the consideration of identical perpetrator and victim without
resort to a "distinctive modus operandi" analysis of other
factors.
5 7
*2, Jan. 16, 1995, available in WESTLAW, OJ. Comm. database.
151. People's Response, supra note 4, at *3.
152. Id.
153. Ruling on Defendant's In Limine Motion To Exclude Evidence Of Domestic
Discord with Appendix at *2-*4, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768 (Cal.
Super. Ct. L.A. County July 22, 1994) [hereinafter Ruling].
154. The court also found that these incidents were admissible over the defendant's
§ 352 objections. "[The incidents] involve either a direct observation of defendant engaged
in assaultive conduct against Brown Simpson or an admission of such conduct by
defendant. The probative value is strong and outweighs any danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury." Id.
155. Id. at *4.
156. 184 Cal. App. 3d 409, 229 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1986). In Zack the defendant was
convicted of murdering his former girlfriend whom he had beaten to death. Id. at 411,229
Cal. Rptr. at 317-18. Zack presented an alibi defense and thus identity was the disputed
issue. Id. at 412-13, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 318-19. The prosecution was allowed to present
evidence of the defendant's prior assaults on the decedent to prove that it was he who had
committed the murder. Id. at 413-15, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20.
157. Id. at 415, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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The holding in Zack alone justifies the admission of these seven
incidents, but the court also based its ruling on the Evidence Code,
stating that, "[i]t is the relationship between the alleged perpetrator
and the victim that provides the necessary uniqueness required under
Evidence Code Section 1101(b)."'58 Since O.J. Simpson did have a
prior relationship with the victim, and his prior assaults of Nicole
Brown Simpson were offered to show motive, intent, plan, and
identity, the court properly admitted the following incidents under
Zack and California Evidence Code section 1101(b). 59
The first incident admitted occurred in 1982 when the defendant
smashed framed photos of Nicole Brown Simpson's family members,
threw Nicole against a wall, threw her clothing out of the house, and
threw her physically out of the residence." In 1985, a Westec
security officer responded to a call at the defendant's residence.' 6'
Nicole Brown Simpson, crying, and with a puffy face, met the officer
at the defendant's home. 62 She told the officer that she and O.J.
had been fighting, and that when she tried to leave, O.J. beat her car
with a baseball bat. 63 In 1987, witnesses observed O.J. striking
Nicole Brown Simpson and knocking her to the ground in Victoria
Beach."6 In 1988, O.J. ordered Nicole Brown Simpson from their
residence, stating that he was "serious" and had a gun in his hand. 65
In 1989, O.J. was convicted of spousal abuse of Nicole Brown
Simpson."6 In 1988 or 1989, a limousine driver saw O.J. strike
Nicole Brown Simpson in the face and also observed her injuries.
67
In 1989, Denise Brown and a friend watched O.J. slap Nicole Brown
Simpson and push her from a slowly moving car."
The admission of these incidents could have been unduly
prejudicial to O.J. Simpson. Jurors might have concluded that O.J.
Simpson's past abuse of his wife demonstrates that he is a bad person
and is therefore more likely to have committed the murder. Although
158. Ruling, supra note 153, at *2.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id.
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the character evidence rules prohibit this very line of reasoning, the
court admitted the evidence and gave the jury a limiting instruction
admonishing them not to draw this forbidden conclusion.
169
V. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR ABUSE IN PEOPLE V. SIMPSON
UNDER THE PROPOSED APPROACH
Each incident of abuse admitted by the court in, Simpson would
also be admitted under the proposed approach. All of the incidents
would be relevant for the same purposes: to show the nature and
quality of the relationship, and a pattern of conduct by O.J. toward
Nicole. However, the proposed approach would not limit jurors to
considering the abuse evidence only as it relates to intent, motive,
identity, and plan. Jurors could also evaluate the abuse as evidence
that O.J. Simpson had a propensity to beat his wife.
After providing the jurors with evidence of a pattern of abuse,
the court would allow them to conclude that O.J. Simpson had a
propensity to abuse Nicole Brown Simpson-as opposed to inferring
that O.J. was a person with a general propensity for violence-and as
a person with a tendency to abuse Nicole Brown Simpson, it is more
likely that he was the person who committed this final act of violence.
Allowing the jury to consider past abuse in this way, coupled with
expert testimony about Battered Woman Syndrome, 7 ' will help
jurors see how physical abuse in a relationship can be a precursor to
a more serious violent incident, like murder. Expert testimony also
169. California Criminal Jury Instruction 2.50 states:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant
committed [a crime] [crimes] other than that for which [he] [she] is on trial.
Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you
to prove that defendant is a person of bad character or that [he] [she] has a
disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence was received and may be
considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to
show: [The existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime
charged;] [The identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of which
the defendant is accused;] [A motive for the commission of the crime charged;]
.... For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you
must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. You
are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose.
CALJIC, supra note 139, No. 2.50.
170. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1107 (West 1995); People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
332, 338 n.9 (1992) ("Section 1107 appears to make expert testimony admissible in any
criminal case, regardless of the charges or defenses, except a case in which the batterer is
prosecuted for his acts of abuse and the evidence is offered to prove that he committed
those acts."), rev'd on other grounds, 8 Cal. 4th 728, 883 P.2d 388, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270
(1994).
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helps jurors understand why A ,person repeatedly subjected to a
pattern of violence would stay in such a relationship."'
VI. CONCLUSION
Contrary to common -understanding, domestic violence is not a
family problem or a private matter. Victims of domestic violence can
only be helped if family, friends, neighbors, police, and judges
overcome their reluctance to meddle in the seemingly private affairs
of others. Greater understanding of how the battering cycle can
escalate into more violent abuse will shatter this reticence. This
process will succeed only if the public is truly informed about
domestic violence and can recognize signs of abuse.
172
Likewise, jurors should hear about abuse evidence so they can
learn how domestic violence affects its victims. More importantly,
jurors in spousal homicide cases should hear abuse evidence so they
can put the homicide irito context with the atmosphere of violence
that was present in the relationship. The judicial system should be
designed to include such important evidence to show the public that
a trial really is a search for the truth.
The laws should favor harsh punishment for those who kill their
spouses,' because this ,type of crime betrays the most basic
trust." Although this proposal does not provide for stiffer punish-
ment of batterers who kill their spouses, it will treat them less
favorably at trial. Perhaps the allowance of prior abuse as evidence
171. The value of expert testimony was described in State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563
(Kan. 1986):
Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would help dispel the
ordinary lay person's perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free
to leave at any time. The expert evidence would counter any common sense
conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really that bad the woman
would have left her husband much earlier. Id. at 567.
172. Duttofi, supra note 105, at 24 ("Signs of domestic violence are not always easily
recognized . ... The reason has more to do with the complex dynamics of domestic
violence and the secrecy and distortions that shroud it.").
173. I would also favor adopting a domestic homicide statute like Minnesota's which
provides for a first degree murder charge for one who kills an intimate relation. See
generally Hobday, supra note 26 (discussing Minnesota's first degree murder domestic
homicide statute which presumes intent based on the defendant's prior abuse of the victim
and other aspects of the victim-defendant relationship).
174. Id. at 1296-97 ("[Wlomen, due largely to their traditional role as mothers and
caretakers, are essentially 'connected' with others. This 'connection' creates for women
a strong sense of duty and responsibility, which ... explains why they often remain in
abusive relationships.... [V]iolence between members of the same family or household
constitutes a breach of 1rust." (citations omitted)).
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of a propensity to abuse the victim will make it-easier for a prosecutor
to convict a batterer with a history of abuse. Giving such a procedur-
al advantage to a prosecutor in a spousal homicide case may deter
spousal homicide and domestic violence. By assuring the admission
of abuse evidence, we can make certain that the violent acts of
abusers have been noted and will work against, them in the future if
they murder their spouses.
Legislators, judges, lawyers, and the public all have roles to play
in stopping domestic violence.'" Legislators need to adopt new
solutions, like the proposal suggested in this Comment, since the
current system cannot protect women from batterers. However,
reform efforts should not be limited to amending the evidence
code."6 Any solution that promotes public understanding of
domestic violence and aims at preventing spousal abuse and homicide
should be considered.
The absence of a special rule allowing past acts of domestic
violence in spousal homicide cases can lead to unjust results. What
if Judge Ito had agreed with the defense arguments which sought to
prevent evidence of O.J. Simpson's abuse of Nicole Brown from being
admitted? Would the jury have received an accurate portrayal of
O.J.'s relationship with Nicole? Would it have been fair for O.J. to
give the jury the impression that, he got along well with Nicole?
Would this have been justice? Would we have fulfilled our responsi-
bility to Nicole, or would we still owe her the truth?
VII. EPILOGUE
On October 3, 1995, O.J. Simpson was acquitted of the murders
of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman.' After 126
witnesses and 133 days of testimony, O.J.,walked out of court a free
man. 78 While many different conclusions can be drawn from this
175. See William F. Blews. Domestic Violence: We Can Help, 68 FLA. BJ. 14, 14 (1994)
(suggesting that lawyers as leaders have a special role to play in fighting domestic violence
and in educating the public about domestic violence).
176. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1189
(1993) ("[T]here is a critical need for continued expansion and refinement of domestic
violence statutes. No jurisdiction has yet designed the perfect model .... ).
177. People v. Simpson. No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Oct. 3, 1995). See
Lee Margulies, Huge TV Audience Saw Trial Climax, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at A7
(noting that a television audience of 51 million people at home watched the reading of the
verdict on October 3, 1995).
178. Mark Whitaker, Whites v. Blacks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 28, 31.
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verdict, it should not be forgotten that the sequestered jury saw and
heard a different trial than the public. Furthermore, as in any jury
trial the evidence in this case was filtered through the unique life
experiences of the jurors. This was significant in the Simpson case, as
there is evidence that the jury may have been predisposed toward the
defense from the beginning.
Prior to jury selection, the prosecution's jury-consulting
firm-DecisionQuest--concluded the jury favored the defense.7 9
For example, 42% of the jury stated that they or a family member
had a negative experience with law enforcement.' A staggering
75% of the jury believed that O.J. was unlikely to commit murder
because he excelled at football.' Also surprising is that 42% of the
jury thought it was acceptable to use physical force on a family mem-
ber.8 2 Only two of the jurors graduated from college, and 67% said
they derived their information from evening tabloid news.' The
background of the jury may explain in part why the public viewed the
evidence so differently.'84
Despite the seeming haste of the verdict, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that there was doubt as to O.J. Simpson's
guilt.8 Thus, while the acquittal may seem unbelievable or unjust
to some, we cannot and should not doubt the jury's verdict.8 6
Rather than second guess the decision itsel, we should look at how
the jury reacted to and handled the domestic abuse evidence. At
least two jurors disregarded the domestic violence evidence that was
presented by the prosecution. Following the verdict, juror Lionel
Cryer stated "[t]his was a murder trial, not domestic abuse. If you
want to get tried for domestic abuse, go in another courtroom and get
179. Mark Miller & Donna Foote, How the Jury Saw It, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at
37, 39.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Public opinion polls taken after the verdict revealed that 74% of whites thought
O.J. Simpson committed the murders while 66% of blacks thought O.J. did not commit the
murders. Id.
185. Richard Lempert, The O.J. Verdict: Why It Had to Be Right, at *1, Oct. 4, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, OJ. Comm. database ("Both a not guilty verdict and a guilty of
Murder II verdict are defensible in the sense that reasonable people could honestly and
intelligently look at the evidence differently and return either verdict.").
186. Id. at *2 ("One conclusion I draw is that this verdict is no reason to lose faith in
the jury system however one feels.").
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tried for that."'87  Juror Brenda Moran described the domestic
abuse issue as "a waste of time.'""M The Simpson trial was in no
way representative of the criminal justice system, thus we should be
hesitant in drawing conclusions from such an aberrant trial.
Be that as it may, it is always important to examine the reactions of
the jurors to the evidence and how it was presented.
Contrary to the fears of the defense, the jury did not convict O.J.
Simpson because he had abused his wife. In fact, they were able to
separate O.J.'s behavior in the past from the evidence linking him to
the crime and regard the abuse evidence as irrelevant. However,
neither the statements of the jurors nor the verdict should be taken
to imply that domestic abuse evidence is not a proper matter to be
considered in a spousal homicide case. To prevent jurors from
hearing and seeing the ravages of domestic violence would be to
disregard Nicole and all battered women.
Even though the Simpson case was presented to the public
through media saturation, it should not be lightly assumed that the
coverage of the case adequately exposed the problem of domestic
violence. Nor should it be forgotten that many men are still abusing
their girlfriends and wives every minute. Attempts to educate the
public about domestic violence need to continue after 0.3. Simpson's
acquittal is forgotten by the short attention span of public opin-
ion."
Benjamin Z. Rice*
187. Rob Pool & Amy Pyle, Case Was Weak Race Not Factor, Two Jurors Say, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at Al, A6.
188. Id.
189. Anita Hill, One Verdict, Clashing Voices, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 46, 51.
"Whatever you think of Simpson's guilt or innocence, there was uncontroverted evidence
of his abusive behavior. Lest the message be to disregard domestic violence, we ought to
pause and recognize our interest in ending this form of abuse." Id.
* I wish to thank Professor Laurie L. Levenson for her assistance in writing this
paper and for providing me access to the courtroom to view a day of testimony in People
v. Simpson; my family for their love and support; and the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review editors and staff for their hard work. I would also like to dedicate this paper to
my grandparents, Honey and Pop, whose youthful enthusiasm is a continuing inspiration.
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